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European integration in the 1980s:  
on the way to Maastricht? 
 
N. Piers Ludlow 
 
The Maastricht Treaty emerged out of one of the most tumultuous periods of recent 
European history.  In the course of the two years preceding the December 1991 
European Council at which the intergovernmental negotiations were concluded and 
the treaty text finalised, the whole international context of the European Community 
had been transformed most notably by the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of 
the Iron Curtain and the unification of Germany.  In between the Maastricht Council 
and the signature of the Treaty in February 1992, moreover, a further geo-political 
earthquake would occur, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Little wonder then 
that many observers have speculated on the effect that this remarkable series of events 
had on the shape of the European agreements concluded amongst the Twelve EC 
member states.  Particular attention has been paid to the supposed connection between 
French acquiescence in German unification, and German acceptance of France’s 
desire for rapid progress towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the core 
component of the Maastricht Treaty.  As David Marsh puts it: ‘the fusing of the two 
Germanys, and the birth of the single currency, are intimately intertwined.  If 
unification had not happened, it is highly unlikely that France would have been able 
to persuade [German Chancellor] Kohl to agree the EMU timetable to replace the D-
Mark by the Euro.’1 
 This article does not seek to reject entirely the link between the Maastricht 
Treaty and the geo-political revolution of 1989-91.  As other contributors to this 
special issue will make clear, the intra-European politics of 1989-91 were crucial in 
determining the exact shape and timing of the Treaty, and such politics could not but 
be influenced by the end of the Cold War and the transformation of Germany.  It will 
however suggest that as important, if not more important, in determining the 
fundamental shape and contents of the 1991 Treaty, as well to some extent its timing, 
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was the longer term trajectory of European integration, stretching back at least as far 
as the early 1980s, if not further.  No complete explanation of what happened amongst 
the Twelve in 1990-91 is possible without extensive acknowledgement of the trends 
and directions of the integration process that had developed during the preceding 
decade. Multiple pressures for extensive Treaty change had already accumulated by 
early 1989 and it was hence always likely that many in Brussels and beyond would be 
campaigning for radical advance in the years that followed, albeit with no absolute 
guarantee of having all of their ambitions fulfilled. To put it slightly differently, 
‘Europe’ was on the move well before the geo-political transformations of November 
1989 onwards. 
 In order to demonstrate the importance of the legacy of the 1980s, this article 
will focus on four different ‘trends’ that had emerged during the decade each of which 
fed through into the Maastricht debates.  These trends are first the importance of 
treaty change as opposed to less formalised advance, second the desire to ‘tidy up’ 
those aspects of the integration process that had initially begun outside of the formal 
Community context, third the ever great faith in institutional change as a means cope 
with the EC’s constantly expanding range of tasks and challenges, and fourth a 
tendency towards policy spill-over.  Each of these will be looked at in turn, before a 
concluding section which will return to the issue of how important these longer term 
pressures and trends would turn out to be. 
 
The irresistible rise of belief in Treaty change 
Over the last twenty five years or so the history of European integration has been 
punctuated by repeated instances of treaty change.  Indeed an author contemplating a 
historical overview of the process might well be tempted – unwisely perhaps – to 
organise his or her findings in a series of chapter titles that reflect these institutional 
milestones: so a section on ‘From the Single European Act to Maastricht’ would be 
followed by one covering ‘From Maastricht to Amsterdam’, the next would take the 
story from Amsterdam to Nice, and so on all the way through to the 2007 Treaty of 
Lisbon or perhaps even the recent fiscal pact.   Treaty change has, in other words, 
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become a regular occurrence and one seen by many as an essential feature of any 
significant alteration in the way that ‘Europe’ functions.2   
 This has not always been the case, however.  For the first two decades of the 
Community’s evolution most of the major changes in the way in which the system 
operated took place without formal treaty modification and its accompanying features 
of intergovernmental conferences, formal signing ceremonies and (lately at least) 
fraught ratification processes.  There were, it is true, a number of treaty changes 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  These included the 1965 Merger Treaty, the 1970 
Luxembourg Treaty modifying the Community’s financial base, and the 1975 
Brussels Treaty which constituted another attempt to do the same.3  Each enlargement 
of the Community’s membership moreover was accompanied by the signature and 
ratification of a treaty of accession.4  But none of these treaty changes covered the 
really important modifications in the way that the Community was actually run.  
Instead, the gradual growth of Council power that occurred during the 1958-69 
period, the emergence of the European Council as the Community’s most senior 
decision making body, and the move towards the direct election of the European 
Parliament happened without treaty sanction (even if this last had been provided for in 
the Treaty of Rome).5  Calls for more formalised reform – such as that issued by the 
Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans in 1975 – had, by contrast, not come to 
fruition.6 
 By the early 1980s this process of informal change was widely (if probably 
unjustly) perceived as one of the roots of the Community’s malaise.  A crucial way 
out of the doldrums in which the integration process seemed stuck was thus logically 
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seen as being far-reaching institutional change, carried out through a formal re-writing 
of the treaties.  Gaston Thorn, the President of the European Commission, for 
example used the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in March 
1982 not only to decry the trend towards institutional innovation ‘on the fringes of the 
Treaties, if not entirely outside them’, but also to call for ‘a new Messina Conference 
in this the Treaties’ jubilee year.’7  Of particular importance in this connection was 
the way in which such treaty change might allow an increase in the use of majority 
voting – an issue to which we will return below.  But above and beyond this obsession 
with majority voting, treaty change more generally came to be seen as the means to 
break the policy and institutional deadlock in which the EEC of the early 1980s 
seemed to be trapped.  The path from the Genscher-Colombo proposals of 1981 which 
envisaged institutional change but shied away from formal treaty alteration, to the 
Stuttgart Declaration of 1983, and then onto the deliberations of the Dooge 
Committee of 1984-5, is thus marked by an ever growing conviction amongst most of 
those eager to see renewed Community dynamism, that such a revival could only 
come about were the treaties to be modified.8  The groundwork for the famous and 
controversial decision at the Milan Council of June 1985 to convene an 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) and to begin work on what would become the 
1986 Single European Act (SEA) had been laid in a debate stretching right across the 
first half of the 1980s.9 
 The association between treaty change and Community advance had then been 
massively strengthened by the perceived success of the Single European Act.  The 
new treaty had not immediately been hailed as a breakthrough.  The Economist had 
been typically dismissive, almost certainly reflecting a British governmental view that 
they had successfully rid the treaty text of most of its most radical elements.10  But 
Commission President Jacques Delors had also had his doubts, airing these to the 
European Parliament in a highly cautious speech outlining the results of the IGC.11  
By the late 1980s, however, all such uncertainty had disappeared and there appeared a 
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near consensus that the treaty had fundamentally transformed the manner in which the 
Community operated, had dramatically freed up its decision-making processes and 
was hence at the heart of all the far-reaching policy advances that characterised the 
final years of the decade.  That the subsequent behaviour of the most high profile 
opponent of treaty change in 1985, Margaret Thatcher, had also demonstrated the 
depth of her opposition to radical integration, only reinforced the association between 
treaty change and pro-Europeanism since it suggested that those against treaty change 
were also fundamentally Euro-sceptic.12  By the late 1980s it had thus become 
axiomatic that if Europe was to become more integrated it needed to do so by means 
of formalised treaty change.  The very nature of the process that was to culminate in 
Maastricht in December 1991 was hence deeply shaped by this ‘lesson’. 
 
The desirability of tidying up informal change 
Closely related to this belief in treaty change as an essential component of any move 
towards ‘ever closer union’, was an equally strong belief that steps already taken 
outside of the treaty framework should, if at all possible, be brought back within the 
formal structures. Although this was not a new phenomenon – the Merger Treaty in 
the 1960s had been used to retrospectively sanction the establishment of the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) for instance despite the fact 
that this had been a key component of the Brussels machine ever since 195813 – it was 
once more an urge that had become very apparent with the SEA and had been 
strengthened still further by that treaty’s success. 
 The two main types of ‘tidying up’ carried out by the SEA related to the 
European Council and to European Political Cooperation (EPC), the mechanism for 
foreign policy coordination amongst EC member state governments.  Article 2 of the 
Act had thus provided the first formal recognition of the European Council’s place 
within the Community system, although it did little to specify either the extent of its 
powers or the centrality to the integration process that it had already acquired.14  Title 
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III of the treaty meanwhile placed the EPC process on a more official Community 
footing, bringing inside the formal institutional system a series of intergovernmental 
mechanisms that had inhabited a strange legal penumbra ever since their creation in 
the early 1970s.  In the process, the Commission’s role within the EPC mechanisms 
for foreign policy coordination was legally affirmed – the culmination of a lengthy 
pitched battle between France and most of its partners on this issue.15  In neither case 
was the treaty in any real sense altering the status quo.  Rather it was retrospectively 
ratifying a series of arrangements that had emerged informally over the previous 
decade and a half. 
 This same basic pattern was at its most evident in the Justice and Home 
Affairs element of the Maastricht Treaty – the eventual pillar three.   Here the 
informal realities that Maastricht would begin to acknowledge were the development 
of police cooperation across Europe underway since the mid-1970s in the so-called 
Trevi Process and the push to eliminate border and passport controls within Europe 
that had started with the signature of the Schengen Treaty between France, Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in June 1985.  Neither of these were 
originally Community policies, as the highly restricted initial membership of the 
Schengen group underlined.  The signatories of this last had not believed that their 
ambitions of eliminating border controls completely stood much chance of realisation 
within the wider EC.  Nor, by the late 1980s, had the process of implementation yet 
gone very far.  Indeed the Schengen Convention, setting out the manner in which the 
original agreement would be translated into actual practice, was only signed in 1990 
this time by seven states (Spain and Portugal having joined the original five 
signatories), with implementation only picking up speed in the mid-1990s.16  
Similarly, the Trevi process was carried on outside of the Community framework, 
involving structures that echoed those of the EC Council of Ministers, but with no 
equivalents of the Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of 
Justice.17  But the very existence of these extra-Community instances of integration 
provided an incentive for the Community itself to begin discussing these issues more 
formally and to assess the extent to which these policy initiatives could be brought 
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‘in-house’.  Trevi and Schengen would thus provide one of two important stimuli to 
the debate that was to emerge in the run up to Maastricht about how to bring within 
the EC framework a series of policy areas – border control, police cooperation, 
immigration - that had traditionally been little affected by the integration process. 
 
The need for institutional innovation 
A third major ‘lesson’ of the 1980s was the perceived necessity of pushing ahead with 
the institutional innovations introduced by the SEA.  Crucial to the latter’s success 
had been the introduction of majority voting for all internal market related legislation.  
This change had been widely – if inaccurately – credited with breaking the deadlock 
which was meant to have beset the Community ever since the Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966.18  And it had certainly transformed the behavioural patterns of 
ministers and other national representatives discussing policy change in Brussels, 
creating the expectation amongst them that meetings were likely to produce a 
legislative outcome rather than impasse, and thereby providing a major incentive for 
constructive policy proposals instead of stonewalling. The speed of decision making 
was increased as a result.19  It therefore followed – from the point of view of 
European enthusiasts at least - that any new round of treaty change had to extend this 
successful innovation to other policy fields also.  The Commission had already flirted 
with controversy at several points in the late 1980s by trying to push through 
legislation that was only tangentially related to the internal market using the new, 
post-SEA legal base.20  An extension of majority voting to a range of further policy 
areas would remove the need for such procedural legerdemain.   This was all more 
necessary given the likelihood, discussed below, that the policy domain of the 
Community would substantially increase.  More policy areas would mean more 
legislation, and more legislation would only be possible were the productivity of the 
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institutional system increased across the board rather than solely on issues concerning 
the Single Market. 
 Similarly, there was extensive support for a further increase in the powers of 
the European Parliament in any new treaty.  The cooperation procedure introduced for 
Single Market legislation by the SEA had been well received, both by European 
parliamentarians themselves, and by the many partisans of a stronger EP within 
national governments and elsewhere.  But this increase in parliamentarians’ influence 
had only whet the appetite of MEPs and their numerous backers for further movement 
in the same direction.  After all the more active Europe of the late 1980s only 
aggravated the concern surrounding the ‘democratic deficit’ – the more Europe did, 
the more worrying was the lack of a strong democratic component within the 
Community system – and increased the need for an increase in the EP’s role that went 
beyond the welcome but inadequate first step taken in the SEA.21  Again therefore any 
new European treaty was likely to have to go some way in meet this demand, despite 
the ongoing reticence of certain member states, notably the British and the French.  
On the powers of European Parliament as with majority voting, the successor treaty of 
the SEA would be expected to repeat and extend the successes of the SEA itself. 
 Another innovation, this time not foreshadowed by the SEA, that any new 
European treaty would have to pay heed to was the notion of subsidiarity.  This idea 
had begun its migration from Catholic social teaching to European affairs in the mid-
1970s, first cropping up in the discourse of the Christian Democrats within the 
European Parliament.22  By the late 1980s, however, it had begun to feature in 
European Community debates at Council of Ministers level, promoted by an odd 
alliance between German Länder, anxious to avoid their powers being eroded by a 
supranational level of governance over which they had scant control, and those 
member states, notably the United Kingdom, most apprehensive about too much new 
intervention by Brussels.  Its prospects of actually being incorporated in any treaty 
text – which would of course happen with the Maastricht Treaty – were vastly 
improved however by the fact that it could be used both as a mechanism to allay the 
fears of those anxious about undue EC power and as a justification for Community 
action in those instances where actions by individual member states were unlikely to 
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prove effective.  Its early uses in the 1970s had indeed all been in the context of 
appeals for greater rather than lesser European powers.23  Subsidiarity, in other words, 
could be a justification for integration, as well as a protection against too much central 
control.  More relevant for this article, however, is the fact that yet another prominent 
feature of the Treaty of European Union was already part of the European landscape 
well before the Berlin Wall came down. 
 
Policy spill-over 
The fourth and final trend that links the late 1980s with the shape and agenda of the 
Maastricht Treaty, is the way in which the policy achievements of the later 1980s – 
the Community’s boom years – created substantial pressures for further integration in 
related areas.  The late 1980s, to put it slightly differently, saw the re-emergence of 
the notion of spill-over as a mechanism of a Community development.  This idea, 
much touted by the neo-functionalists during that earlier period of rapid Community 
advance, the 1960s, had been attacked and discredited by Stanley Hoffman in a 
celebrated 1966 article; by the late 1980s, it seemed to have re-emerged from its 
grave.24  And this revival would have major implications for the subsequent contents 
of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 The most straightforward instance of previous policy advances creating strong 
pressure for further policy change occurred in the field of monetary integration. For 
most of the 1980s the majority of European Community member states had grown 
accustomed to membership of the European Monetary System (EMS).  This was 
generally credited with both avoiding the violent intra-European exchange rate 
fluctuations of the 1970s and bringing inflation under control across the continent.25  
But the success of the EMS was grounded in part on the existence of capital controls 
in a number of the weaker currency countries, which allowed governments to limit the 
outflow of money, thereby making it much easier for their currencies to remain within 
the exchange rate fluctuation bands prescribed by the monetary regime.  These capital 
controls, however, were a clear violation of the free movement of capital, one of the 
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four freedoms at the heart of the Single Market Programme.  In the course of the late 
1980s, therefore France, Italy and several other countries were obliged to abolish their 
laws on capital exports, bringing closer the realisation of the 1992 target for a fully 
operational internal market, but also seriously endangering their capacity to remain 
within the EMS.  Advance in one area, posed a direct threat to integration in another 
equally crucial aspect of integration. 
 European policy makers were most clearly alerted to this potential problem by 
the publication of Efficiency, Stability and Equity, a Commission-sponsored report 
produced by a committee chaired by the eminent Italian economist Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa in 1987.26  This made use of the Mundell-Fleming ‘impossible trinity’ 
model to argue that Europe could not aspire to have free movement of capital, fixed 
exchanged rates, and national macro-economic freedom all at the same time.  Up until 
the late 1980s, the EMS had sought to balance the last two while forsaking the first.  
But with the abolition of capital controls either fixed rates or macro-economic 
freedom would have to be abandoned instead.  Translated into policy terms this meant 
that Europe faced an imminent policy dilemma.  Either it could let go of the path 
towards monetary integration it had successfully followed since 1979, or it could push 
ahead towards tighter integration, at the expense of national macro-economic 
freedom.  This second option would not necessarily require a single currency – the 
Padoa-Schioppa report remained non-committal on this issue – but it was already 
clear that with currency controls slated for removal, the current monetary status quo 
was unsustainable.  And given the widespread sense that monetary integration so far 
had been beneficial and that a return to the volatility of the 1970s was highly 
undesirable, the most likely course out of the dilemma would be a move towards 
greater monetary integration.  The intellectual case for the EMU component of the 
Maastricht Treaty had therefore been set out even before the convening of the Delors 
Committee on economic and monetary union in 1988.  
 The other equally clear-cut instance of policy advance in one area creating 
strong pressures for further integration elsewhere concerns what would become the 
justice and home affairs portion of the Maastricht Treaty.  Here too the trigger factor 
was the planned Single Market.  Establishing a truly unified European market, most 
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member states felt, would involve a substantial scaling down of, if not the total 
abolition of most border controls and checks.  This would facilitate commerce and 
also offer a visible sign of integration to the wider population.  In the new Europe, 
crossing frontiers, whether for tourists or for those doing business, would no longer 
involve long queues for border checks.27  But the removal of barriers to cross border 
travel would also have knock-on effects on immigration control, visa policy, the fight 
against crime, and the limitation of movement of drugs and other illegal products, 
since in all of these cases national border controls were a central element in existing 
policy.  Shorn of their national border controls, European states would have no option 
but to cooperate much more closely, establish joint or at least coordinated approaches 
on all of these issues, encourage interaction and cooperation between customs 
services, police forces and immigration officials, and pool resources so as to reinforce 
the strength of the Community’s outer borders since these would now constitute the 
last barrier between the outside world and Europe’s border control-free interior.28  
The planned Single Market thus combined with the pre-existing pressures connected 
with the Schengen Treaty and the Trevi process discussed above, to help create 
momentum towards what would become in due course the Justice and Home Affairs 
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 The final example of spill-over is less direct, but too important nonetheless to 
exclude, since it contributed to the emergence of the second pillar of the eventual 
treaty, dealing with a common foreign and security policy or CFSP.  The basic desire 
to see Community Europe better able to ‘speak with one voice’ on foreign policy 
issues was of course nothing new.  Attempts in this direction could be traced back to 
the Fouchet Plan of 1961 if not earlier.29 Nor was dissatisfaction with the 
inadequacies of the EPC process, in existence since the early 1970s.  Despite some 
low-key successes, this last had not brought about the degree of coordination between 
the external relations of European powers that many had initially hoped for.30  The 
Genscher-Colombo plan of 1981 referred to above had been one of several 
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unsuccessful attempts to remedy its failings.  But this underlying level of discontent 
had been massively accentuated by the general surge forward of the integration 
process in the late 1980s.  If all other aspects of integration were advancing – as 
seemed to be the case in the latter stages of the decade – the halting progress of EPC 
was especially frustrating.  And the contrast was made even starker by the huge 
amount of external commercial leverage that the Community in general and the 
Commission in particular had been able to exercise in the context of the major world 
trade talks of the period, namely the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Within the context of the global trade forum, the newly 
revitalised European Community had been very much at the centre of attention, with 
the Commissioners involved, Willy de Clerq and then Frans Andriessen for external 
affairs, Andriessen and then Ray MacSharry for agriculture, able to exercise an 
influence and clout rivalled only by the US Trade Representative.31  This appeared to 
demonstrate that when Europe was able to act collectively on a world stage it could 
exercise the type of power and influence that no single Western European country had 
been able to deploy since the end of the Second World War.  The incentive to try and 
create mechanisms and structures that would give the Community comparable 
influence in foreign policy matters that stretched beyond trade and agriculture grew 
significantly as a result.  The policy successes of the late 1980s thus added fuel to a 
pre-existing policy debate, and helped create the conditions out of which pillar two of 
the Maastricht Treaty would eventually be born. 
 
A foreseeable agenda; an unforeseeable outcome 
None of the trends and pressures outlined above predetermined the exact features of 
the Maastricht Treaty.  Apart from anything else, the depth and sophistication of the 
discussions about different aspects of what would become the Maastricht agenda 
varied widely.  The debate about EMU, for instance, could not only draw upon a back 
catalogue of academic and policy-related debate stretching back to the 1970s if not 
earlier, but had also been pushed forward by a succession of official study groups, 
most recently those chaired by Delors and bringing together multiple central bank 
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governors and economists.32  Discussions about the precise implications of lowering 
national frontier controls were by contrast much less advanced.  There was hence no 
certainty that the Twelve would try to tackle all of these issues in a single treaty, as 
opposed to spreading them out over the ten to fifteen years ahead. 
 The likelihood of gradual advance was also increased by the very wide spread 
of member state opinions on all of these matters.  Britain apart there probably was a 
consensus by 1989 that more ‘Europe’ – i.e. further integration - was both necessary 
and desirable.33  There was also agreement that the debate was urgent and that 
advances would need to be made sooner rather than later.  Some sort of 
intergovernmental conference in the early 1990s and subsequent treaty reform was 
already very much on the cards.  But views on the exact shape, timing and nature of 
these further European measures varied immensely from member state capital to 
member state capital, and indeed amongst individual officials and politicians within 
each national government.  Forging agreement from so diverse a range of opinions 
would not be an easy task.  Forging agreement quickly, and creating a far-reaching 
Treaty of European Union, within a couple of years would be harder still.   
 All of this means that there is plenty of scope for historians seeking to explain 
what happened at Maastricht to highlight the role and importance of the precise 
politics of 1989-1991, and, more fundamentally, the impact of the extraordinary geo-
political transformation of Europe that occurred from 1989 onwards.  The liberation 
of Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the ending of that Cold War 
framework within which the whole European construction had been built, would all 
significantly affect the future development of the integration process.  German 
unification would greatly alter both the relative strength of Helmut Kohl, the German 
Chancellor, and the attitude of his fellow European leaders towards German power.  
Germany’s capacity to shape the new Europe, but also the determination of 
Germany’s partners to construct a European framework powerful enough to contain 
what had become by some distance the EC’s largest member state, were both 
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increased markedly by the events of 1989 onward.34  The transformed geo-political 
environment meanwhile, characterised by uncertainty as much as opportunity, made 
that much more urgent the tasks of equipping Europe with new powers in both justice 
and home affairs, and foreign policy cooperation.35  And the mere possibility of 
further enlargement, first to Cold War neutrals like Sweden, Finland and Austria 
whose non-participation in the integration process made little sense in a post-Cold 
War world, and then, in the rather longer term, to the newly liberated countries of the 
former Soviet Bloc, highlighted still further the need to streamline the European 
decision-making processes and increase the efficiency of the institutions.  As so often 
in Community history, the prospect of widening membership provided a significant 
incentive for the existing members to deepen integration before the newcomers 
arrived.  
 The basic agenda of what would become the Maastricht Treaty had, however, 
already been defined before these transformations came about.  A Centre for 
European Policy Studies publication, finalised in January 1989 but therefore largely 
written in 1988, already listed the completion of the Single Market, EMU and 
progress towards ‘a European External Identity’ as the three priorities for the years 
ahead, and spoke of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘multiple strategies’ (i.e. varying institutional 
formulae depending on policy area) as crucial characteristics of likely European 
advance.36  This clearly foreshadowed two of the three pillars of the eventual treaty, 
as well as two of the key underlying concepts.  The subjects to which European 
leaders would have to address themselves, if not yet the outcomes of their 
deliberations, were thus largely determined by the pattern of Community development 
in the 1980s rather than by the geo-political earthquake from 1989 onwards. 
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